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Illinois Home Rule and Taxation:
A New Approach to Local Government
Enabling Authority
JAMES BANOVETZ*
THOMAS KELTY**

The single most drastic change in the 1970 Illinois Constitution,
and that document's most important contribution to the art of
government, was the home rule provision contained in its local
government article. It set forth a basis for changing the state's
philosophy regarding the establishment of municipalities, and provided major impetus for moving Illinois municipal law out of the
confines of 19th century ideology.
The 1870 Illinois Constitution was largely silent on municipalities;
most significantly, it placed no limits on the authority of the state
legislature to structure or restrict the operations of such government.'
By so doing, it clearly established the tradition that municipal governments should be agencies of limited powers fully subordinated to the
state legislature. This fit the patterns of the era: citizens were distrustful of all governments, but especially of municipal governments, which
had been riddled by corruption. The operative principle which emerged,
2
and was later reinforced by the judicial doctrine of Dillon's Rule,
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later applied by the courts in each state. Dillon's Rule states, in effect, that municipal
corporations had only those powers specifically granted them by statute and those
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was that municipal governments, indeed all local governments, could
be entrusted only with narrow grants of authority, strictly construed.
That 19th century concept was rejected in the 1970 document for
those Illinois local governments which have acquired home rule power
pursuant to the provisions of Article VII.3 For those governments,
106 at most recent count, an entirely new legal concept has been
created, one which markedly alters the historic relationship between
the state, especially the state legislature, and units of local government. 4 The purpose of this essay is to assess the operational consequences of this new concept as it has developed in Illinois, and the
implications of the IIlinois experience for municipal enabling legislation.

I.

THE

HoME

RULE CONCEPT

The concept of home rule itself is not new. Indeed, it dates back
to 1875 when Missouri made such powers available to its cities with
populations of over 100,000.1 Efforts to secure home rule for the city
of Chicago date back even earlier. Chicago's efforts to obtain greater
freedom from state legislative control led to the provision in the 1870
Constitution which required that all laws affecting municipalities must
be of "general application. ' ' 6 This was followed, in 1872, by the
passage of the state's first general municipal corporations act, which
was viewed at that time as the most effective and flexible general
municipal charter law in the nation. 7
"Home rule" became the term used to describe Chicago's efforts
to gain greater freedom from state legislative control. Efforts to
3. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6. These home rule provisions apply only to counties
which elect a chief executive officer on an at-large basis; cities and villages with
populations of 25,000 or more (unless subsequently discontinued by referendum);
and other cities and villages in which the voters have adopted home rule powers by
referendum. All other counties, cities, villages, and all other units of local government
in Illinois continue to operate under the statutory provisions enacted under the 1870
Illinois constitution, and as subsequently amended. Thus, the principles of narrow
interpretation of statutory principles (Dillon's Rule) continue to apply to all such
governments.
4. R. Kustra, The Formulation of Constitutional Home Rule in Illinois
(1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file in University of Illinois Library,
Urbana, Illinois).
5. S. Cole, Illinois Home Rule in Historical Perspective, in HOME RULE IN
ILLINOIS 11, 14 (S. Gove and S. Cole eds. 1978).
6. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. IV, § 22(10).
7. D. Smith Canfield, Illinois Home Rule and American Democracy: A Study
of Anticipations, Consequences, and Prospects for the Future 101 (1979) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation on file in Northern Illinois University Library, DeKalb).
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secure legislative authorization for Chicago home rule failed in 1904,
1907 and 1922. Downstate legislators were unwilling to grant the city
such freedom. In part, their reluctance was a reaction to the perceived
corruption of city politics, but, even more, the issue was political. As
long as Chicago's legislative representatives had to bargain with
downstaters for the authority needed to govern the city, the downstaters had a powerful position from which to secure legislative
benefits for their own districts.'
The trend began to change in the 1950's, following the release of
the Chicago Home Rule Commission's 1954 report which described
9
home rule in legal rather than political terms. The Illinois Municipal
League began a study in 1955 which related home rule to the needs
of cities and villages throughout the state. Local officials saw home
rule as a means of gaining more flexible local powers, escaping
restrictive court interpretations of local powers, and as some relief
from the politics of the General Assembly, which had to approve
every change in local government powers or structure. Thus, the stage
was set when the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention convened
in Springfield in 1970.10
The convention delegates ignored the traditional home rule format, which called for locally adopted charters through which local
voters would prescribe the organization and powers of the municipal
government. They recommended, instead, what has been termed "the
2
most liberal" utilization" of the newer, residual powers system (or
3
what some have called a legislative supremacy model).
Under the Illinois approach, a home rule government is authorized to "exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to
its government and affairs"'' 4 which has not been denied to it by the
state constitution or by state statute. This has been interpreted by the
Illinois Supreme Court to mean that "[h]ome rule units ... have the
same powers as the sovereign except where such powers are limited
8. Id. at Chapter 111.

9. CHICAGO HOME RULE COMMISSION, CHICAGO'S GOVERNMENT: ITS STRUCTURAL MODERNIZATION AND HOME RULE PROBLEMS (1954).
10. The changes brought to the home rule debate by the Chicago Home Rule

Commission's 1954 report are best summarized in Canfield, supra note 7, at Chapter
IllI.
11. Cassella, A Century of Home Rule, NATIONAL GUIDE REVIEW, October,
1975, at 441, 448.
12. PREPARATORY

COMM.

MENT-REFERENCE MANUAL

PA. CONSTITUTIONAL

50 (1967).

13. Cole, supra note 5, at 16.
14. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).

CONVENTION,

LOCAL GOVERN-
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by the General Assembly. . . [H]ome rule units
have an autonomy and independence limited only by restrictions imposed by the
Constitution or authorized by it.""5 The Constitution further directs
that the "[p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be construed
liberally." 16
Professor David C. Baum, legal counsel to the 1970 Constitutional Convention's Local Government Committee, characterized the
intent of the home rule provisions in these words: "The presumption
relating to local powers is reversed with respect to home rule units:
before, local governments were thought to possess no powers except
those granted by statute; now they possess most governmental powers
except those specifically denied to them by statute ... 7 In his
writings after the convention, Baum asserted that the framers' intent,
in setting up the provisions for legislative and judicial oversight of
home rule, was to establish a system which provided for concurrent
exercise of power by the state and by home rule units and which
would avoid implied preemption by judicial decisions. The Illinois
system, in Baum's view, placed almost exclusive reliance on the
legislature rather than the courts to keep home rule units in line.
The basic concept, of course, is that popular expectations of
government have changed in the twentieth century. The concept of
limited government was born in the colonial era-the notion that
government governed best which governed least. In such a context,
the notion that local government should have strictly limited powers
was not surprising, and even the home rule charter approach was
designed simply to transfer control over the limits of those powers
from the state legislature to local voters.
The New Deal era of American politics changed public perceptions of government. Government began to be seen, not as an evil to
be limited, but as a tool for improving human lives. With its change
in perception came a change in demands for government action - and
a change in the definitions of government power. The notion that the
national government was an agency of delegated powers, for instance,
was replaced by the view that the national government is able to
exercise any power that state and local governments can exercise - in
15. City of Urbana v. Houser, 67 Il.2d 268, 273, 367 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1977).
16. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m).
17. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and
Limitations, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137, 138 (1972) [hereinafter Baum, Part I]; Baum, A
Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part II); Legislative Control, Transition
Problems, and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 561 (1972)
[hereinafter Baum, Part II].
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short, any power that is needed to respond to popular demands."
Home rule, as used in Illinois, is a means for extending this new
philosophy of governmental power to the local level. By providing
broad enabling authority to local elected officials, Illinois home rule
gives local governments the power to exercise any local power that is
needed to respond to popular demands for government action.
II.

THE ILLINOIS HOME RULE EXPERIENCE

Home rule has received a very mixed reception in Illinois. Voters
at the county level, where home rule has been linked to structural
reform of county government, have soundly rejected the concept at
every referenda opportunity.19 Municipal voters have been more supportive; the aggregate number of voters at the municipal level favoring
home rule has surpassed the number opposing it, although referenda
to adopt home rule powers have failed more often than they have
carried. 20 Perhaps most significantly, however, voters in communities
which have had home rule have shown strong support for retention
of those powers. There have been 26 referenda held to abolish home
elections, and favored
rule; home rule has been retained in 21 of these
21
margin.
3-2
a
by
by voters, in the aggregate,
The composite record of reaction to home rule by the state
legislature and the state courts has been better. In the aggregate, both
agencies have acted favorably toward home rule more often than not,
but in neither instance have actions or reactions routinely favored
home rule.22 There are significant instances in which both the legisla2
ture and the courts have acted to impair home rule powers. However,
18. This concept of the rule of the national government, and the extent of the
powers of that government, is now widely accepted by scholars. As applied to local
governments, for example, it is summarized in P. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 13 (1981).
19. See CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES AT NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, COUNTY HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS, (D. Beam, A. Pattakos, D. Tobies eds. 1977)
[hereinafter D. BEAM]. See also, BANOVETZ AND KELTY, HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS:
IMAGE AND REALITY 8-9 (1987) [hereinafter BANOVETZ AND KELTY].
20. See BANOVETZ AND KELTY, supra note 19, at chart on p. 8. Since the chart
was developed, there have been more than a half dozen additional referenda; home
rule has been rejected in nearly every recent election.
21. Id. (Since the chart on that page was devised, home rule has been retained
in one additional city, Pekin).

22. D. BEAM, supra note 19, at 12 et. seq.
23. The principal legislative impairments were laws authorizing local government employees to engage in collective bargaining, specifying procedures for public
access to municipal documents, and establishing a uniform state-wide minimum age
for purchasing alcoholic beverages. The principal judicial impairment, discussed at
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there is only one instance - state preemption of the power to set a
minimum age for the purchase and consumption of alcoholic beverages - in which the legislature, the principal agency for protection
against home rule abuse, has acted to correct problems attributable
to the use of home rule powers. 24
While much attention has focused on home rule issues in Illinois,
relatively little has been paid to home rule accomplishments. Home
rule was the source of the authority used in Oak Park, for instance,
to achieve racially balanced residential neighborhoods. DeKalb used
home rule powers to develop a special board to arbitrate disputes
between landlords and their university student renters. Highland Park
used home rule to develop low and moderate income housing; Bloomington and Normal used it to establish a joint mass transit system;
Deerfield used it to innovate new methods of controlling juvenile
vandalism; and Park Forest used it to develop a modern personnel
system for municipal employees.
The most common use of home rule powers, however, has been
to develop and finance local economic development programs. Sauget,
for example, used home rule to expedite the marketing of industrial
revenue bonds; cities such as Rock Island and Watseka have used it
to help finance new industries and shopping centers; and Peoria and
Galesburg have used it to help renovate their downtown business
districts.25
The 1970 Constitution's framers, meeting in 1987 to assess their
product after 16 years of experience, summarized their reaction to the
Illinois home rule experience in the following words: "How has home
rule worked? It hasn't succeeded in reducing the number of taxing
bodies through consolidation as intended, but it has slowed their
proliferation. It has also provided flexibility for popular choice, and
has facilitated intergovernmental cooperation. On the whole, its use
26
has been restrained. "

length in this paper, was the decision in the Chicago Services Tax case which
broadened the definition of occupation taxes (Commercial National Bank v. City of
Chicago, 89 Il1. 2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982). There have been other impairments,
but these have been those which have been viewed as the principal threats to home

rule principles.

24. D. BEAM, supra note 19, at 13.

25. Home rule users are summarized in
at 4-11.

BANOVETZ AND KELTY,

supra note 19,

26. COMMITTEE OF 50 TO RE-EXAMINE THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION, THE 1970
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ASSESSMENT BY THE DELEGATES (Draft Summary) 14
(1987).
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Home rule accomplishments have largely been in the areas of
economic development, local regulation, and program development.
As important as these may be, they have attracted very little public
attention, debate or opposition in Illinois. The home rule actions that
have sparked controversy, and thus have fueled the opposition to
home rule, have been actions relating to taxation.
The opposition to home rule in the constitutional convention
centered largely on the fear that home rule would lead to burdensome
taxes. 27 That same fear has played a major role in the defeat of home
rule at the county level.2 8 Indeed, taxation has been a dominant issue
in all of the state's home rule referenda campaigns.2 9
Not only is taxation the dominant theme in referenda campaigns,
but it has also been a major topic for legislative and judicial reaction
to home rule. For instance, the Illinois General Assembly has not
given home rule units the authority to levy taxes on income, earnings,
or occupations. The Illinois courts have also been most concerned
about municipal action in the field of taxation.
If there is any single issue which would lead to strong resistance
to the home rule system of local enabling authority, that issue would
be taxation. If there is any single area in which broad grants of
authority to local governments would be unacceptable, that area would
be taxation. If such grants of authority are not workable, that failure
would manifest itself first in the area of taxation. Thus, it is the home
rule record on taxation which will be examined in detail below.
III.
A.

ENABLING AUTHORITY FOR TAXATION

THE TAXING POWER

There are three important elements in the determination of the
home rule taxing power. The first is the grant of power itself: the
power to tax was specifically enumerated in the constitution as a part
of the grant of home rule authority.3 0 Thus, subject to subsequent
27. SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1970, Record of Proceedings, Vol. VII, 1591, 1614, 1628 (1972).
28. D. BEAM, supra note 19, at 103-108.
29. BANOVETZ AND KELTY, supra note 19, at 16. While this source lists taxation
as the second most frequently cited issue in home rule referenda campaigns, the
concern over taxation was also universally at the root of concern over lack of trust
in local officials. In simple language, voters who did not trust their local officials
feared that such officials could not be trusted with local tax powers.
30. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
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limitations imposed by law, home rule units were given broad, unspecified powers to enact taxes.
Second, the constitution established the following limitation on
that power: "A home rule unit shall have only the power that the
General Assembly may provide by law . . . to license for revenue or
impose taxes upon or measured by income or earnings or upon
occupations." 3'
Third, it was the framers' intent that it would be the Illinois
General Assembly, and not the Illinois courts, that would act to place
additional limits, if any, on the constitutional grant of power. 2 This
was detailed in the constitutional provisions under which the General
Assembly was authorized to preempt home rule power: it could, by a
simple majority vote, provide for the exclusive state exercise of a
power (presumably including the power to tax), or, by a three-fifths
vote in each chamber, deny home rule units the authority to exercise
a specified power. 3 Professor Baum described the intent of these
provisions when he wrote, "the thrust of the Illinois provisions ...
favor concurrent exercise of power by the state and by home rule
units and attempt to avoid implied 'preemption' by judicial decisions.
The Illinois approach places almost exclusive reliance on the legislature
rather than the courts to keep home rule units in line." 34
The enabling provisions regarding home rule units' taxing powers,
then, were designed to provide a broad grant of authority, but with
the power to levy taxes on income, earnings or occupations limited
to the scope of powers provided by the General Assembly, and with
the presumption that additional restrictions on those powers would
come only from the General Assembly.
B.

THE LEGISLATIVE REACTION

The General Assembly has not reacted at all to these constitutional provisions. This has had two quite different effects. First, and
most important, the General Assembly has not acted to grant home
rule units any new or added authority to impose taxes on income,
earnings or occupations. This can be interpreted negatively, since it
means that the General Assembly has not given home rule units taxing
authority presumably intended for them by the constitution's framers.

561.

31. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e)(2).
32. See the statement attributed earlier to Baum, Part I, supra note 17, at
33. ILL. CONST. art VII, § 6(g), (h).
34. Baum, Part H, supra note 17, at 579.
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Second, it has not acted to impose any added restrictions on the grant
of home rule taxing power. This can be interpreted positively, since
the General Assembly has made no move to limit home rule authority
in this area.
Initially, the General Assembly's failure to act on income, earnings and occupations taxes was not surprising. The state had just
enacted a state-wide tax on income and shared a portion of the
receipts with local governments. Federal revenue sharing was enacted
at about the same time, providing yet another new source of income
for local units.35 Local governments also had access to their traditional
power to levy property taxes, and they had gained the authority to
levy a sales tax in addition to their existing power to add a local levy
to the state's retail occupation (sales) tax.
Yet, over time, and with the termination of federal revenue
sharing,3 6 the absence of power to tax incomes, earnings or occupations became increasingly restrictive, particularly for the City of
Chicago. While home rule governments made increasing use of their
new tax powers, none had the potential revenue-raising power of taxes
which might be levied on income, earnings or occupations. The result
led some observers to question the value of home rule:
The difficulties which continue to plague Illinois cities
and counties are problems that probably cannot be solved
under home rule as it currently exists ....
The principal
problem . . . may be the lack of revenue sources rather than
the lack of regulatory authority. This problem probably cannot
be solved under the current home rule provisions ....
Progressive taxes that are truly proportionate to the taxpayer's
ability to pay are not available under home rule. .... 17
Truly meaningful (i.e., productive) sources of new revenue have not
yet been made available to home rule governments in Illinois.
35. Federal revenue sharing was a program, enacted during the first term of
President Richard M. Nixon, under which a designated sum of money was distributed
annually to state, county, municipal, and township governments. Distributions were
based on a formula which took into account, for each such unit, the socio-economic
status of its residents, the wealth of local tax bases, and local tax effort. Poorer
communities received substantial revenues from this source; wealthy communities,
particularly in suburban areas, received relatively little.
36. Revenue sharing for states was terminated during the first term of President
Reagan; revenue sharing for local governments was terminated during Reagan's
second term.

37. R. Michael & J. Norton, Home Rule in Illinois: A Functional Analysis,
1978 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 602.
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C.

THE MUNICIPAL RESPONSE

Home rule opponents predicted, and some have even claimed,
that home rule governments would use their broad taxing powers to
levy new, burdensome taxes on their residents. In their view, such

broad taxing powers would provide a temptation that local officials
would be unable to resist, and local taxpayers would be forced to pay
the price of too much government power.
This prediction has not been borne out in practice, however.
While it is true that many new taxes have been levied with home rule
authority, it is also true that 40% of all home rule governments have

not used their home rule taxing powers at all.38 Fewer than 20076 of
home rule governments have increased their property taxes above the
statutory limits imposed on non-home rule governments.

9

Instead, what has happened is that local communities have used
their home rule powers to institute an array of new taxes designed to
shift the tax burden from local property taxes to taxes that are paid

by non-residents as well as residents of the community. Home rule

powers have been used to impose local taxes on the rental of hotel
and motel rooms, on the sale of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes,

on tickets to spectator events, on the sale of gasoline, on retail sales,
on the sale of food and beverages in restaurants, on the sale of new
motor vehicles, on the transfer of title to real estate and on mobile

homes.

In general, such taxes have been levied when the burden of their
incidence would fall primarily on non-residents of the community.

Cities with large regional shopping centers, for example, are most
likely to levy a retail sales tax;4 cities with many transient visitors are
most likely to tax the sale of gasoline and restaurant food and
beverages. 41 Home rule communities with large hotel/motel complexes
38. The material on taxation in this section is reported in more detail in
BANOVETZ AND KELTY, supra note 19, at 6, 10, 18 et. seq.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Voters in Mt. Vernon, for example, adopted home rule when local officials
promised that they would use home rule powers to adopt a local sales tax. Mt.
Vernon is a regional shopping center; its stores attract residents of many adjacent
rural counties. By adopting home rule, voters demonstrated their preference that

needed new taxes come form sales taxes, paid partially by shoppers from out of
town, rather than new utility taxes which wouid be imposed solely on local residents.
Local sales taxes are also popular in communities which have large state universities,
such as Carbondale and DeKalb, for it gives the community the ability to place a tax
on the purchases of the university students.
41. Taxes on the sale of restaurant food and beverages are popular in large,
down-state cities such as Rockford, Peoria, and Rock Island for they enable the city
to tax persons from out of town who come to the city on business.
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first introduced the municipal tax on the rental of such rooms in
Illinois42 and communities with high volume, regional automobile
43
dealerships pioneered the local tax on the sale of new automobiles.
It was this same tendency to tailor local sales taxes so that they
would transfer as much tax burden as possible to non-residents, and
simultaneously avoid placing local businesses at a competitive disadvantage, that has led to wide variations between communities in the
base upon which sales taxes are levied. The state sales tax is, in
reality, a retail occupation tax. It is a broad-based tax on the
occupation of retail sales in the state. When it was passed, the state
authorized cities and counties to levy an additional retail occupation
tax on the same tax base. Virtually all cities and counties have done
so. Later, the state exempted retail sales of food and drugs from the
state tax, but not from the local portion of the tax. Despite this
difference in tax base, the state collects both state and local portions
of the tax, remitting the local portion to the appropriate local government.
Because of the prohibition against levying occupation taxes without legislative authorization, home rule governments do not have the
power to increase the rate of the retail occupation (sales) tax which
they levy in conjunction with the state tax. However, such governments do have the power to levy a tax on sales of commodities, and
an increasing number (currently 17) of home rule governments are
doing so. In designing their sales taxes, however, these governments
are each developing their own idiosyncratic definitions of the kinds
of sales which are subject to tax. Variations exist in the coverage of
food and beverages, agricultural equipment, industrial equipment,
restaurant food and beverages, and the amount of the sale that is
taxed."4 Some communities, for example, tax only the first $500 of
the value of any sale; other communities exempt sales above a stated
45
amount, such as $5,000, from the tax.
42. Such taxes were first introduced by Rosemont which is located next to
O'Hare Airport and has several thousand persons staying each night in local hotel
rooms. The hotel/motel tax is the most frequently used home rule tax. After seeing
its popularity, the General Assembly authorized non-home rule governments to levy
a hotel/motel tax, but such cities may spend the proceeds of such taxes only to
promote local tourism.
43. Arlington Heights, which is home to several large, high volume auto
dealerships, was one of the first to introduce this tax.

44. See appendices E and F in Revenue Review Committee Proposalsto Reform

the Illinois Tax System, A Report Submitted to Governor James R. Thompson, April
1987.
45. Id. at Appendix C.
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Two problems have emerged from this proliferation of local sales
taxes in the state. First, although the Illinois Department of Revenue
is authorized to collect these taxes and remit the proceeds to the
levying community, it has refused to do so because of the local
variations in tax base. Thus each local government must establish its
own system for the administration and collection of these taxes.
Second, such local sales taxes, when added to the state and local retail
occupation taxes, produce variations in applicable sales tax rates
throughout the state. The Governor's Revenue Review Committee has
recently labeled this system "unnecessarily burdensome" and argued
that it "causes retailers with multiple locations throughout the state
to have particular difficulties."' ' As a result, the Committee has
recommended that home rule authority to levy sales taxes be replaced
by state authorization which would allow home rule governments the
authority to increase the percentage which they could levy as part of
4
the local government portion of the state's retail occupation tax. 1
Home rule communities, however, are resisting this proposal. On
its surface, the proposal offers financial benefits: the state, under this
system, would handle all tax administration and collection. Home
rule units, however, see themselves losing in two ways: (1) they would
lose the option to tailor their sales tax base to local economic
circumstances; and (2) more seriously, from their point of view, they
would lose home rule tax autonomy in return for taxing authority
which would be controlled by the state. They see the proposal as an
attempt to erode their home rule powers.
The proposal offers an example of the classic confrontation posed
by home rule: the interest of the state, which is concerned with the
state-wide business climate, is set against the interest of local communities, which want the autonomy to tailor their taxing systems to
their local economic needs. The state sees the confrontation in terms
of state-wide interest; local communities see the confrontation in
terms of both local interest and the preservation of the integrity of
the home rule system.
From an analytic perspective, a further issue is posed by the
proposal: to what extent should broad-based local government enabling authority empower local governments to advance their local
interests at the expense of the broader state-wide interests? Placed in
a different perspective, it poses the issue of whether the state as a
whole is better served by stronger local communities, even at some
46. Id. at Recommendation #2.
47. Id.
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cost in terms of state-wide uniformity, or is better served by statewide uniformity when such uniformity must be achieved at the expense
of weakened local governments.
It is important to note, in this regard, that neither state nor
business interests have publicly contended that home rule units, in
exercising their sales tax authority, have acted in a fiscally irresponsible fashion or misused their authority. At issue is simply a question
of state-wide interest as opposed to local interest in the construction
of the taxing system. Ultimately at issue is whether a legislative
response, asserting the state's interest, is justified as a means of
responding to legitimate, individual home rule community uses of
home rule taxing powers.
D.

THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE

Contrary to the framers' expectations, the courts have played a
more active role than the legislature in reviewing, defining and limiting
home rule powers, including home rule taxing powers. The judicial
response to home rule has varied: lower courts have generally fallen
back on traditional, narrow construction of municipal powers when
dealing with home rule issues, 48 but the Illinois Supreme Court has
been generally responsive to the philosophy and intent of home rule.
It has even, on occasion, cited the constitutional directive that home
49
rule powers be liberally construed.
Thus, it is the courts which have been most involved in developing
the record of state reaction to the home rule concept regarding local
government enabling acts and, in particular, to the taxing powers
which have been a part of those enabling acts. Therefore, the courts'
reactions to those taxing powers deserve particular scrutiny.
IV.

THE COURT AND HOME RULE POWERS

Perhaps the most important signal of the Illinois Supreme Court's
reaction to home rule came in two early rulings which, more than any
others, gave legal acknowledgement to the intent of the Constitution's
framers. These were cases in which the court declined the opportunity
to impose what would have been broad and unspecified statutory
limitations on the exercise of home rule powers.
The first case dealt with the question of whether statutory restrictions on the exercise of municipal or county powers, enacted prior
48. BANOVETZ AND KELTY, supra note 19, at 14.
49. See, e.g., Paper Supply Co. v. City of Chicago, 57 Il. 2d 553, 317 N.E.2d
3 (1974).
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to the 1971 effective date of the 1970 Constitution, should be interpreted as state preemptions of home rule powers. In Kanellos v. Cook
County,5° the supreme court considered whether a statute passed prior
to 1970, requiring counties to hold a referendum before the issuance
of general obligation bonds, was applicable to Cook County. The
court held that while the General Assembly had the power to impose
a referendum requirement on home rule counties, its action prior to
the adoption of the constitution had not complied with the constitution's three-fifths majority vote required to do so. 5 In a similar case,
Sommer v. Village of Glenview,5 2 the court also held that legislation
in effect prior to the 1970 Constitution did not limit home rule
powers, for it violated the new constitution's home rule provisions by
imposing a legislative check on home rule powers without complying
with constitutional requirements.
A year after Kanellos, the court amplified the principle of that
case when it asserted that statutes restricting the exercise of local
government powers did not apply to home rule units unless the statute
53
explicitly indicated such a legislative intent.
Through these cases, the Illinois Supreme Court effectively ruled
that the general body of statutory law restricting the powers of local
government did not automatically apply to home rule units; rather,
both a specific statement of legislative intent to achieve that purpose
and the applicable provisions of Article VII relating to legislative
preemption had to be met before home rule powers were circumscribed
by statute.
A. THE POWER TO TAX

The courts have generally upheld the legitimacy of the uses which
have been made of home rule taxing powers. The Illinois Supreme
Court upheld home rule taxes on the retail sale of liquor despite the
state's extensive taxation and regulation of the liquor industry (which
demonstrated that even though the matter was of statewide interest,
it was nevertheless related to local government and affairs within the
meaning of the constitution's home rule powers grant).5 4
50. 53 I11.2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972).
51. Id. at 165, 290 N.E.2d at 243.
52. 79 I11.2d 383, 403 N.E.2d 258 (1980).
53. Rozner v. Korshak, 55 I11.2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973) (the issue at bar
concerned restrictions on municipal wheel taxes which passed both houses of the
General Assembly by more than a three-fifths vote after the effective date of the
1970 Constitution).
54. Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 111. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 916 (1976).
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The courts have also ruled that home rule governments may
5 6 on the
impose taxes on amusements55 and the sale of cigarettes
grounds that the incidence of such sales taxes is imposed upon the
purchaser and not upon the occupation of the sales agent. They have
held that home rule ordinances levying wheelage taxes on bases other
than those set forth in state law did not represent a licensing for
revenue and did constitute a valid classification leading to a reasonable
system of taxation. The courts have also held that taxes on the rental
of hotel or motel rooms were taxes upon the use of tangible personal
property58 and a privilege tax,5 9 rather than a tax upon occupations.
rule
They also approved the simultaneous levy of a tax by a home
0
transaction.
sales
same
the
upon
city
rule
home
a
county and
Not all court actions, however, have favored home rule; the
courts have made it clear there are limits beyond which they will not
go. For instance, the action of a home rule county imposing a higher6
'
court filing fee to support the county law library was not approved.
The court held that the constitution did not authorize home rule units
to legislate for the judicial system or impose a fee upon access to the
courts. 62 In another instance, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to
permit a home rule municipality to levy a tax on a special service
district, even though such action was authorized by the constitution,
to provide the procedures to be followed
until the legislature had acted
63
powers.
such
in exercising
In the recent case of People ex rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland
Park" the court, in holding that the home rule powers of Illinois
municipalities do not extend to the area of prevailing wages for local
construction projects, stated in part that the "limited grant of power
to home rule units in Section 6(a) legitimizes only those assertions of
authority that address problems faced by the regulating home rule
55. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 150 v. City of Peoria, 76 Ill. 2d 469,
394 N.E.2d 399 (1979).
56. S.Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972).
57. Rozner v. Korshak, 55 Ill. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973).
58. Springfield Hotel-Motel Assoc. v. City of Springfield, 119 Ill. App. 3d 753,
457 N.E.2d 1017 (1983).
59. Marcus Corp. v. Village of South Holland, 120 Ill. App. 3d 300, 458
N.E.2d 112 (1983).
2d 312, 291 N.E.2d 823 (1972).
60. City of Evanston v. County of Cook, 53 Ill.
61. Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 111. 2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
62. Id. at 542-542, 338 N.E.2d at 18-19.
63. Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan v. Village of Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d 200,
296 N.E.2d 344 (1973).
64. 121 Ill. 2d 1 (1988).
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unit, not those faced by the State or Federal governments. ' 6 Thus,
the court imposed further restrictions on the scope of home rule
power, and in so doing, reached its conclusions without relying upon
the liberal interpretation mandate of the constitution 6 and without
attempting to distinguish Kanellos.
B.

TAXES ON INCOME, EARNINGS AND OCCUPATIONS

It is taxes on income, earnings, and occupations which have
generated the most controversy. This was evident within the Sixth
Constitutional Convention itself. Some delegates argued that home
rule governments needed such tax authority to gain access to the
revenues that would be needed to accomplish home rule powers. 67
Other delegates, including some home rule supporters, countered with
three arguments: (1) local variations in the use of such taxes "could
impair the efficient operations [of business] within the state"; 68 (2)
limits on such powers were necessary in order to gain public support
for the new constitution; 69 and (3) occupation taxes had been used in
another state (Colorado) as a device to circumvent state limits on
local use of income taxes. 70
A majority of the convention's delegates adopted the restriction
against "taxes upon or measured by income or earnings or upon
occupations" because they feared that home rule practice in this area
without legislative control might well lead to a profusion of local
income taxes and a burden on business. They were also convinced
that the home rule powers provided sufficient taxing powers to achieve
home rule goals without the use of these taxes, and they feared that,
without such limitations, voters would refuse to ratify the new constitution.
C.

THE OCCUPATION TAX

From the first year of ratification of the new constitution, the
most controversial home rule issue in the Illinois courts has been the
nature of the taxes falling within the definition of an "occupation
65. Id. at 12.
66. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m).
67. SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONvENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,
Vol. IV, 3366 (1972).
68. Id.at 3151.
69. Id. at 3162.
70. Id. at 3157. The Colorado case in which the matter was litigated was City
and County of Denver v. Duffy Storage and Moving Co., 168 Colo. 91, 450 P.2d
339 (1969).
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tax" and thus subject to the limitations of legislative authorization.

Initially, the courts employed a narrow definition of occupation tax.
instance, taxes on the sale of cigarettes and
They approved, for
71

amusement tickets.

The landmark ruling came in 1974 in a test of the City of
Chicago's Employer's Expense Tax, a tax imposed on employers at
the rate of three dollars per employee per month. In Paper Supply
Co. v. City of Chicago,7 2 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the tax,

rejecting the argument that the tax was an occupation tax. In its
decision, the court reasoned that if it broadened the definition of an
occupation tax beyond that used under the 1870 constitution,73 home

rule sources of revenue would be narrowed, and such narrowing

would be in direct conflict with the delegates' intent that home rule
units should have broad powers. 74 The court concluded that, in the

event some harm arises from its interpretation, the legislature was

authorized to correct the situation by a three-fifths vote of both
houses. 7 The court, in essence, ruled that courts must consider three
conditions when ruling on whether an ordinance created an unconsti-

tutional occupation tax: (1) the courts must construe home rule powers

liberally; (2) the tax must be upon a specific occupation to be an
occupation tax; and (3) the ordinance in question must place the legal

the seller in order
incidence for the tax on the consumer rather than
76
to avoid being categorized as an occupation tax.
71. See supra notes 55 and 56 for case references.
2d 553, 317 N.E.2d 3 (1974).
72. 57 I11.
73. See id.
[An occupation tax has one of two missions: either to regulate and control
a given business or occupation, or to impose a tax for the privilege of
exercising, undertaking or operating a given occupation, trade or profession.
Its effect is to license a person engaged in a given calling or occupation. A
license in form may not be issued to a taxpayer but the payment of the tax
is the license under the authority of the State to engage in such occupation.
Regulation is not a necessary adjunct of an occupation tax. It may or it
may not be. The payment of the tax itself is a condition precedent to the
privilege of carrying on a business or occupaiton. The payment of the tax
is made mandatory by the act creating it upon the right of thy individual to
follow the given occupation. An occupation tax may be levied under the
general police powers of the State, where its purpose is to regulate or control
a given occupation, or it may be levied under the general sovereign powers
of the State, where its sole purpose is to raise revenue.
104, 108, 188 N.E. 889, 892 (1933).
Id. at 566 quoting Reif v. Barrett, 355 I11.
2d at 570, 317 N.E.2d at 12.
74. Paper Supply, 57 I11.
75. Id. at 571, 317 N.E.2d at 12.
76. Paper Supply Co., 57 11. 2d 553, 317 N.E.2d 3 (1974).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

This reasoning was changed and the definition of an occupation
tax was broadened appreciably in 1982 when a subsequent Chicago
ordinance levying a tax upon the sale of services was challenged. In
Commercial Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago,7 the court
broadened the definition of an occupation tax, stating that "[tihe
word 'occupation' in this case must be considered in the broader
context . . .and the tax must be judged by the standard of whether
it is one imposed upon the privilege of engaging in the business of
selling services, that is, in service occupations. ' 78 The court also held
that, if an ordinance imposes a service or occupation tax and is thus
unconstitutional, it is not necessary to consider where the legal
incidence of the tax is placed. 79
The immediate consequence of the Commercial Nat'l Bank case
for home rule units was severe. Not only did the ruling invalidate the
Chicago services tax, it also reversed the Paper Supply finding on the
Chicago Employer's Expense Tax. 0 More severe for home rule, the
court immediately used the rationale of that ruling in another case,
Waukegan Community School Dist. No. 60 v. City of Waukegan,"l
in which it held that municipal taxes imposed on consumers' use of
telephone, electricity and gas were unconstitutional taxes on the sale
of services. 82 Noting that these municipal taxes were levied on consumers, the court found that they were substantially similar to the
municipal utility occupation tax ordinances authorized by the Illinois
Municipal Code. 3 Thus, the court concluded that these were invalid
and impermissible occupations taxes.8 4 In so ruling, the court foreclosed one of the more productive taxes that had been developed
through home rule powers.
Thus, while the courts had started a pattern of interpretations of
the scope of the term "occupations tax" which had been narrow, and
thus favorable to home rule, it reversed direction in the Commercial
Nat' Bank case and moved to a much broader, and thus more
restrictive, definition of the term, leaving in its wake a more narrow
range of potential taxing authority for home rule governments.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

89 Ill.
2d 45, 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982).
Id. at 62, 432 N.E.2d at 235.
Id. at 79, 432 N.E.2d at 243.
Id. at 59-62, 432 N.E.2d at 233-35.
95 I1. 2d 244, 447 N.E.2d 345 (1983).
Id. at 255, 447 N.E.2d at 350.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2 (1981).
95 Ill.
2d 244, 255, 447 N.E.2d 345, 350 (1983).
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IMPLICATIONS FOR HOME RULE ENABLING AUTHORITY

From two different perspectives, home rule in Illinois has been a
success. 85 First, it has been successful because it has produced a flow
of creative new ideas for making local government more effective.
The introduction of the hotel/motel tax is one such idea; the development of the real estate transfertax, now being used by an increasing
number of suburban communities in the Chicago area, is another
innovative source for local revenues developed through the application
of home rule powers. Outside of taxation, the innovations attributable
to home rule are even more numerous. Home rule has been used, for
example, to develop innovative approaches to resolving problems
involving neighborhood racial integration (Oak Park), maintenance
of residential properties (Park Ridge), elimination of neighborhood
blight (Berwyn), improvement of landlord-tenant relations (DeKalb),
promotion of more extensive intergovernmental cooperation in regional economic development (Normal), control of juvenile vandalism
(Deerfield), facilitate the demolition of unsaf6 buildings (East St.
Louis), and expedite the sale of industrial revenue bonds (Sauget).
Second, home rule has been successful in the sense that it has
not produced failures. Instances of possible abuse of home rule powers
are few, and the courts, the General Assembly, and the referenda
process have proven effective in placing boundaries around the use
of home rule powers. Seventeen years after its adoption, home rule
governments continue to function, evaluations of home rule have been
positive, 6 and voters in municipalities which have used home rule
have voted by an overall 3-2 margin to retain home rule. In general,
as an enabling act for the development of local government powers,
the approach taken in the home rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution would appear to be successful.
In the area of taxation, however, it is harder to reach that
conclusion. It is in the area of taxation that the principal constitutional
restraint on home rule powers was specified - the limitation on the
power to tax income, earnings or occupations. It is also in this area
that voters are most reluctant to trust the judgment of their local
officials, as evidenced by the results of home rule referenda throughout the state. In addition, it is in this area that the courts have interjected themselves to place the most severe constraints on the use of
home rule power.
85. See BANOVETZ AND KELTY, supra note 19.
86. See THE 1980 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ASSESSMENT BY THE DELEGATES,
supra note 26; BANOVETZ AND KELTY, supra note 19, at 24-31.
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To be sure, the judicial record to date is largely supportive of
home rule, even in the area of taxation. The court ruling in Paper
Supply set forth clear guidelines for deciding the difficult "occupations tax" issue, and set forth guidelines which gave full recognition
to the constitutional framers' mandate to construe home rule grants
of authority liberally. If the record had been left at Paper Supply,
home rule would indeed have been well served. But the record was
not left there; Paper Supply was reversed by Commercial Nat'l Bank
and the new trend was further aggravated by Waukegan Community
School Dist. As a result, the residual pool of home rule taxing power
was severely curtailed.
Interestingly, the limitation on occupation taxes was imposed
partially to prevent the use of the income tax and partially to avoid
irregular patterns of taxation in different communities across the
state, which would impose a hardship on business.17 Ironically, neither
of the taxes rejected in the Commercial Nat'l Bank and the Waukegan
Community School Dist. cases involved those difficulties.
What prompted the court's action, rather, was the Chicago
Services Tax, which imposed a sales tax on the sale of services by
such business and professional persons as lawyers, doctors, accountants, barbers, and repair services. The Home Rule Attorneys group
of the Illinois Municipal League had opposed the enactment of the
tax, fearing that the tax, linked closely as it was to occupations,
would pose an excessive risk of adverse court action and offset the
favorable pattern of rulings that had developed in the wake of Paper
Supply. Regardless of this concern, the City of Chicago imposed the
tax, and the Home Rule Attorney's worst fears were realized with the
ruling in CommercialNat'l Bank.
Equally ironically, the constitution's authors did not oppose home
rule authority to levy sales taxes on the grounds that variations among
communities in that tax would impose a hardship for business. Yet,
that is precisely the basis behind the suggestion of the Governor's
Revenue Review Committee's proposal that home rule sales tax authority be curtailed in favor of broader legislative authorization to
levy a local retail occupation tax. Given the consequences of the court
action narrowing home rule tax authority, it is not surprising that
municipal officials have reacted negatively to a proposal that would
involve legislative action which would have the same effect.
Thus, the grant of authority given to home rule units to levy
taxes is under siege. Threats to home rule tax powers are more than
87.

SIXTH ILLINOIS

Vol. IV, 3151 (1972).
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just threats to that authority; they are threats to the very essence of
home rule itself. As participants to the Sixth Constitutional Convention correctly noted, home rule powers to address community issues
powers to raise the revenues needed to
are hollow without corollary
88
implement such powers.
Even the constitutional convention delegates who voted to impose
the limitations on the power to tax income, earnings and occupations
understood this linkage between tax power and the other home rule
powers. The founders, however, believed that they had given home
rule units adequate taxing power, particularly in light of their liberal
construction mandate. That mandate was integral to the court's action
in Paper Supply, but it was ignored in Commercial Nat'l Bank and
again, more recently, in Bernardi.
The ultimate irony is that these narrowings of home rule authority
stem less from abuses of home rule powers, which legislative and
judicial review were designed to prevent, and more from concern over
taxpayer convenience. To be sure, the Chicago Services Tax might
have constituted an inappropriate use of home rule taxing power, but
the remedy in that case did not require reversal of the findings in
Paper Supply, nor did it subsequently merit the court's findings in
Waukegan Community School Dist.
The court could have found against the Chicago Services Tax
without necessarily overlooking the constitutional mandate that home
rule powers be liberally construed. It need not have overruled Paper
Supply, in holding that the Chicago Services Tax fell within the
definition of an occupation tax, by defining the occupation tax as
broadly as it did. By broadening that definition, however, it severely
limited the range of home rule taxing authority and, in so doing,
undermined the utility, if not the functional capability, of the broad
based enabling principle inherent in the Illinois home rule experiment.
VI.

SUMMARY

What the courts have accomplished is a demonstration of the
weakness of the principle that local governments can function effectively with broadly defined powers. That weakness is not, as so many
have feared, the inability of local governments to use such powers
responsibly.
Illinois' home rule cities and villages have demonstrated that
narrow, limited grants of power are not needed to enforce responsible
local government behavior. The behavior of home rule cities and
88. Id.at 3366.
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villages has been responsible, not because of a lack of power, but
because local policy-makers are restrained by the ultimate check in a
democracy: the will of the people as reflected through the political
process. Even with their broad grants of powers, Illinois cities and
villages have used their authority in a "restrained" manner.8 9 The
reaction of the voters to home rule in those communities which have
exercised home rule powers is perhaps the best evidence that home
rule has, indeed, worked satisfactorily.
Yet, home rule-the use of broad grants of local enabling authority-cannot work unless it is given the latitude which the framers
of the 1970 Illinois Constitution underscored in their liberal construction mandate. The courts and the legislature must be as careful in
protecting the well-being of the home rule system, and must be as
faithful to the liberal construction mandate of the 1970 Constitution,
as they are to the needs and conveniences of those who are ultimately
served by the qualities which home rule can bring to the local
governing process.

89. THE 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ASSESSMENT BY THE DELEGATES, supra

note 26, at 14.

